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Abstract   
Leibniz claims that God acts in the best possible way, and that this includes creating exactly one 
world. But worlds are aggregates, and aggregates have a low degree of reality or metaphysical 
perfection, perhaps none at all. This is Leibniz’s tendency toward acosmism, or the view that 
there this no such thing as creation-as-a-whole. Many interpreters reconcile Leibniz’s acosmist 
tendency with the high value of worlds by proposing that God sums the value of each substance 
created, so that the best world is just the world with the most substances. I call this way of 
determining the value of a world the Additive Theory of Value (ATV), and argue that it leads to 
the current and insoluble form of the problem of incompossibility. To avoid the problem, I read 
“possible worlds” in “God chooses the best of all possible worlds” as referring to God’s ideas of 
worlds. These ideas, though built up from essences, are themselves unities and so well suited to 
be the value bearers that Leibniz’s theodicy requires. They have their own value, thanks to their 
unity, and that unity is not preserved when more essences are added. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
At the end of Leibniz’s life, an anonymous author criticized him for holding “that there is a 
single substance for all things, and that this substance is mind” (GP.VI.625/AG.227). Leibniz 
dismissed the criticism: 
there are as many completely distinct substances as there are monads, and not all the monads are 
minds, and these monads do not make up a whole that is truly one, and the whole, were they to 
make one up, would not be a mind. [GP.VI.625/AG.227] 
These reasons will not surprise contemporary interpreters, who agree that Leibniz broke with 
Spinoza on the number of substances. It is perhaps more surprising that Leibniz made an effort to 
show how close the criticism came to the truth. The passage continues: 
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I am also far from saying that matter is a shadow and even a nothing. These expressions go too far. 
Matter is an aggregate, not a substance but a substantiatum as would be an army or a flock; and, 
insofar as it is considered as making up one thing, it is a phenomenon, very real, in fact, but a 
thing whose unity is constructed by our conception. [ibid.] 
The matter that Leibniz mentions is elsewhere identified as secondary matter, or infinitely many 
coexisting substances insofar as they are coperceived.1 This definition, though metaphysically 
accurate, does not tell us what secondary matter is like. For this, we look to the phenomena 
directly: secondary matter is what populates our experience, the bodies around us, and ultimately 
the world as we experience it.2 The critic must have suggested that Leibniz found no reality in 
matter and all of reality in a single mind. Leibniz untangles the criticism: the completely distinct 
substances of Leibniz’s fundamental metaphysics do not jointly compose a mind, but they do 
compose this secondary matter and the manner of composition depends on mental activity. 
 In this passage and throughout his work, Leibniz offers two ways of understanding the 
actual world. Whereas contemporary interpreters focus on the independence of Leibnizian 
substances and so understand that the actual world is an aggregate and not a substance or a “true 
unity,” the anonymous critic focused on the mind-dependent way in which the actual world is a 
phenomenal or even a conceptual unity. Considered just in terms of its components, the actual 
world is not one thing but infinitely many things. These infinitely many things, however, may be 
experienced as a continuous whole and even grasped under a single concept by a suitably 
powerful mind. For such a mind, whose perceptions are not confused and so not phenomenal, the 
world would have the unity of a single idea. 
 Contemporary interpreters have given significant attention to Leibniz’s idealist ontology 
of aggregates,3 but much less attention to what this implies about the actual world and what it 
means for that world to have some degree of metaphysical perfection. If unity is the mark of 
reality and a prerequisite for metaphysical perfection, then aggregates must lack reality and lack 
                                               
1 On the connection between secondary matter and aggregates, see FB.26-27/AG.274. 
2 On the connection between matter and phenomena, see LDV.302-303. 
3 See, for example, Rutherford 1994; Adams 1994, 244-247; Lodge 2001, and 
Palkoska 2010. 
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metaphysical perfection. 4  Also, as the opening passage implies, the world is an aggregate. 
Leibniz states this directly throughout his work. For example, the world is the “collection of 
finite things” (GP.VII.302/AG.149) and “the whole assemblage of contingent things” 
(GP.VI.107/H.130). It follows that the created world lacks reality and metaphysical perfection. 
 Yet, Leibniz writes that “God has only to make decrees in order that a real world come 
into being” and that “God has chosen the most perfect world” (A.VI.iv.1538-1539/AG.39). 
Somehow, the world is real and to some degree perfect. Not only this, but creating an aggregate 
must be the best that God can do, because creating “the best of all possible worlds” 
(GP.VI.210/H.232) amounts to acting “in the most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but 
also morally” (A.VI.iv.1531/AG.35). In order to make sense of these theodician commitments 
about the world, we must integrate Leibniz’s value theory with the idealist aspect of his ontology 
of aggregates. The former demands unity of the world and only the latter supplies it. 
 With the notable exceptions of Catherine Wilson and Ohad Nachtomy (Wilson 2000; 
Nachtomy 2001), whose arguments I address in Sect. 2, most contemporary interpreters have not 
understood Leibnizian worlds as mind-dependent wholes with their own intrinsic value. Instead, 
they have relied, often implicitly, on what I will call the Additive Theory of Value (ATV): 
the value of an aggregate is the sum of the values of its components. 
The ATV provides a function from the values of each of the created substances to a single value, 
which in turn may be attributed to the aggregate. The theory does not require that the world itself 
be a unity or the source of its own value. Just as the world is nothing over and above its parts, the 
ATV implies that the value of the world is nothing over and above the sum of the values of its 
parts. 
 The ATV respects the status of the world as an aggregate, but it also renders the problem 
of incompossibility insoluble. If God aims to create the world of greatest value, then God aims to 
create the aggregate with the greatest sum of perfections. Putting aside for the moment some 
difficulties with infinite sums, this implies that God aims to create every substance. If Leibnizian 
substances are metaphysically independent (see, for example, A.VI.iv.1550/AG.47), then there is 
nothing in the substances themselves to stop God from doing just this. Interpreting Leibniz’s talk 
                                               
4 I support the connection between reality and perfection in Sect. 3.2. For the connection between 
unity and reality, see especially A.II.ii.174-193/LA.113-129. 
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of incompossibility becomes the search for some tertium quid in addition to the substances 
themselves and the sum of their values that might keep God from carrying out this aim. There is 
no such tertium quid.5 
 I do not defend that negative claim, but I do reframe the problem of compossibility by 
rejecting the ATV, or rather, by rejecting the underlying notion that God chooses among 
aggregates. God’s choice of the best world should not be understood as a choice among different 
aggregates, for these are plural and the ATV is perhaps our best chance at assigning them a 
degree of value, and the ATV, in turn, pushes us to assign the highest value to the world in which 
everything possible is actual. Instead, God chooses among ideas or concepts, each of which 
would supply the unity for a different aggregate of substances were God to create them. 
 These ideas include or encompass the ideas of specific substances, but are nevertheless 
unities in their own right, and so have their own degree of metaphysical perfection. The 
contribution a substance makes to the perfection of its world depends on how that substance’s 
idea relates to the ideas of all the other substances included in its world. So, a substance may 
contribute something other than its own intrinsic degree of perfection.6 On this view, one world 
is more choiceworthy than another if and only if its concept or idea has a greater degree of 
metaphysical perfection. 
 Similarly, substances are compossible if and only if their ideas are included within one 
more encompassing idea that has some degree of metaphysical perfection, or some degree of 
attraction to the divine will. That is, several substances are compossible if God has one reason to 
create all of them. Otherwise, they are incompossible. I build up to a more detailed presentation 
of this view in three steps: (1) a discussion of what Leibniz means by “world,” (2) a more 
sympathetic presentation of the ATV and its relation to the incompossibility problem, and (3) an 
indirect proof that Leibniz’s God evaluated ideal wholes and not aggregates.  
                                               
5 Jeffrey McDonough provides an excellent example of such a search. His tertium quid is the 
structure of space and time as a short of receptacle for extended substances. No substance rules 
out any other by its nature, but only certain combinations will fit into the available space. See 
McDonough 2010. 
6 This point and the whole discussion of the ATV owes much to a similar argument in Shelly 
Kagan 1988. 
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 The discussion in Sect. 2 reveals two senses of “world” in Leibniz, one leaning toward 
acosmism (the view that there is no world) and the other pulling back from this extreme. Section 
3 shows how the ATV draws its strongest support from Leibniz’s acosmist tendency, while Sect. 
4 describes a way around the ATV rooted in Leibniz’s way of resisting acosmism. Leibniz’s 
explanation of the world’s unity also explains incompossibility. 
 
2 The Many Senses Of “World” 
Contemporary modal metaphysics relies on context to distinguish between two different 
meanings of “the world.” The world may be the universe or all of what God creates. The world 
may also be the way that everything is. On the latter meaning, the world is just one world among 
however many other ways things could have been. Leibniz uses the term with just this ambiguity, 
in a passage from the Theodicy: 
I call ‘World’ the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be 
said that several worlds could have existed in different times and different places. For they must 
needs be reckoned all together as one world or, if you will, as one Universe. And even though one 
should fill all times and all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them in 
innumerable ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must needs 
have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason. 
[GP.VI.107/H.131] 
At the beginning of the passage, Leibniz argues that there can only be one world: there can be 
only one collection that includes everything (created), and the world is that collection. At the end 
of the passage, he states that there are infinitely many possible worlds. How can there be 
infinitely many worlds (of any sort) and also at most one world? “World” in “possible world” 
must refer to something different in kind from “world” used without qualification. Just before 
introducing possible worlds, Leibniz mentions an infinite number of ways of filling all time and 
space. I propose that we identify these ways with possible worlds. “World” may refer to the 
maximal collection of created substances, or to the ways that God can create. 
 One might object that Leibniz, as a nominalist, would not quantify over ways for God to 
create, because ways are universals. The objection is misplaced, because Leibniz’s nominalism 
has room for particular divine ideas and even for combinations of divine ideas. These are modes 
of God, but would also represent or express some particular substance or collection of substances 
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were God to create such. Conversely, for every substance that God can create, there is an idea in 
God’s mind that expresses it or its nature. It is in this sense that divine ideas are ways for God to 
create: they are the models for any possible creation.7 
 The ideas or ways are not themselves created. They are independent of what God creates, 
for nothing about creation itself affects the options God faced in deciding what to create. But 
they are not independent of what God knows, because they are what God knows. As the passage 
from the Theodicy states, for God to create a world is for God to create a certain collection of 
substances. If the unique way that a substance is its essence, then an uncreated world is 
constructed from essences. Essences, in turn, either are divine ideas or they are the intentional 
content of divine ideas.8 Either way, they have their ground in God’s intellect, as Leibniz states 
in this passage from On the Ultimate Origination of Things: 
[…] neither those essences nor the so-called eternal truths pertaining to them are fictitious; rather, 
they exist in a certain region of ideas, so to speak, in God himself, the source of every essence and 
of the existence of the rest. [GP.VII.305/AG.151-152] 
This quote is drawn from Leibniz’s essay on the ultimate origin of things. This is appropriate, 
because the two sorts of world have distinct ultimate origins. The sort composed of essences is 
generated eternally in God’s intellect; the sort composed of substances comes to be through an 
act of God’s will. Departing from Leibniz’s own usage, I will distinguish between the created 
world and the infinite number of uncreated worlds. 
 Though they are eternal, there is a sense in which God brings the uncreated worlds into 
being from the ideas of particular substances. God does this not through a creative act of will, but 
through a timeless and necessary act of intellect, or more specifically, of divine wisdom. In an 
extended passage from the Theodicy, Leibniz describes this non-temporal process in a narrative 
mode: 
The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater than that of the wisdom of God, 
who knows all possibles. One may even say that if this wisdom does not exceed the possibles 
                                               
7 Why should God have such models? There is a story to tell about the origin (but not the 
creation) of divine ideas in God’s self-reflection. On this, see especially Nachtomy 2007. 
8 For a dispute about whether essences are best seen as the intentional content of divine ideas, or 
as identical to those ideas, see Nachtomy 2007, 14-16 and Newlands 2013, 165n26. 
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extensively, since the objects of the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a sense 
is alone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of the infinitely infinite combinations it 
makes thereof, and its many deliberations concerning them. The wisdom of God, not content with 
embracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs them one against the other, 
to estimate their degrees of perfection or imperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the 
evil. It goes even beyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinites, that is 
to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each of which contains an infinity of 
creatures. By this means the divine Wisdom distributes all the possibles it had already 
contemplated separately, into so many universal systems which it further compares the one with 
the other. The result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the best from 
among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in order to satisfy goodness completely; 
and such is precisely the plan of the universe as it is. [GP.VI.252/H.271; my emphasis] 
Identifying the essences of substances with divine ideas (or with their intentional content) 
already implies that essences are intelligible. In this passage, Leibniz describes another class of 
entities, here called sequences, systems, or plans—that are constructed from the essences by 
God’s wisdom. Since the members of this class also have their being as objects of an intellect, 
they must be intelligible too. In other words, sequences, systems, or plans are ideas. They are all 
ideas of the same type, because they are all uncreated worlds, or ways that God might create. 
 For Leibniz, intelligibility implies unity, and unity requires the priority of the whole to its 
parts (see, for example, A.VI.iv.1622/MP.81). This is why aggregates are not themselves 
intelligible. It might seem to follow that the sequence, system, or plan of the created world is also 
not intelligible, because it is constructed from its parts, and so posterior to those parts in some 
sense. Indeed, Leibniz adds immediately after the extended Theodicy passage that “all these 
operations of the divine understanding, although they have among them an order and a priority of 
nature, always take place together, no priority of time existing among them” (GP.VI.252/H.271). 
The essences, which come first in the narrative analogy of God’s deliberation, in fact come first 
by a priority of nature. God’s contemplation of possible substances grounds God’s construction 
of uncreated worlds. 
 The posteriority of uncreated worlds to their parts seems to undermine the unity and full 
intelligibility of uncreated worlds, and ultimately to undermine the present account of 
incompossibility, which relies on that unity. This line of objection cannot be right, however, 
because Leibniz claims that “the a priori knowledge of complexes arises from the understanding 
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of that which is not complex” (A.VI.iv.1515/MP.96), which implies that there is knowledge of 
complexes and therefore some sense in which complexes are prior to their parts. 
 Leibniz does sometimes describe uncreated worlds as prior to their parts. In contrast with 
the extended quote from the Theodicy above, Leibniz describes a mental operation in which God 
extracts the ideas of particular substances from uncreated worlds. For example: 
For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and in all ways the general system of phenomena which he 
finds it good to produce in order to manifest his glory, and he views all the faces of the world in 
all ways possible, since there is no relation that escapes his omniscience. The result of each view 
of the universe, as seen from a certain position, is a substance which expresses the universe in 
conformity with this view, should God see fit to render his thought actual and to produce this 
substance. [A.VI.iv.1538/AG.46-47] 
Here we again meet the system, or uncreated world, as well as divine thoughts about particular 
possible substances in the system—but the priority relation points in the opposite direction. God 
extracts the essences of particular substances from the general system by a sort of perspectival 
contraction. 
 Leibniz is apparently committed to a symmetrical priority relation: uncreated worlds are 
somehow both prior and posterior to the essences they contain. To explain this, I argue that 
Leibniz has certain paradigmatic cases of part-whole priority, and that he uses the language of 
priority loosely in non-paradigmatic cases. Non-paradigmatic cases have much in common with 
paradigm cases, but differ in some crucial respects. The commonalities justify Leibniz’s use of 
priority language to describe the relation between essences and uncreated worlds, and the 
differences explain how essences may be both prior and posterior to uncreated worlds. Essences 
are prior to uncreated worlds, but only in a loose sense that does not undermine their unity and 
intelligibility. 
 The first paradigm case is the relation between the secondary matter mentioned in the 
first quote and an aggregate of substances. In an aggregate of substances, the parts are prior to 
the whole because the whole is irreducibly plural. There is no whole at all except insofar as the 
parts are related by some mental operation. The second paradigm case is the relation between a 
line and its points. Here, the reverse is true. There is only the whole, no parts at all unless the line 
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is divided by some mental operation.9 In both paradigm cases, there is a unique direction of 
priority, either from part to whole or from whole to part. Also in both cases, the mental operation 
required to move from prior to posterior generates a new type of entity, secondary matter or 
phenomena from an aggregate and limit points from a continuous line. The generated item, in 
both cases, belongs to a type of entity that is less unified and so less intelligible than its 
ground(s).10 
 In the relationship between essences and uncreated worlds, neither of these 
commonalities apply. There is no unique direction of priority, and the mental operation by which 
God moves from essences to uncreated worlds (or back again) does not produce an item of a less 
unified and so less intelligible ontological type. Dividing or uniting ideas may yield more entities 
of the same type: ideas. The idea of the world is prior to its parts insofar as it is an idea, fully 
intelligible on its own, and the starting point for a mental operation that produces those parts. 
Likewise, the ideas of individual substances are prior to their uncreated worlds insofar as they 
are ideas, fully intelligible on their own, and the starting point for a mental operation that 
produces the whole, or the uncreated world. 
 Of course, it is somewhat paradoxical to call anything prior to X if it is also posterior to 
X. The paradox is resolved if we recognize that Leibniz is using the language of priority loosely, 
based on the similarity between his paradigm cases and the case at hand. Both the essences and 
the uncreated worlds are intelligible on their own in unique mental acts and both may be the 
source of the other through operations of the divine mind. The relations running between 
essences and uncreated worlds have this much in common with the more traditionally named 
priority relations between aggregates and substances, or between continua and their limits. The 
crucial difference is that neither mental operation, from essences to uncreated worlds or back 
                                               
9 See Leibniz’s early dialogue on continua, Pacidius Philalethi (RA.180-181) and the letter to De 
Volder of 30 June 1704 (LDV.302-303). 
10 Leibniz presents the two paradigms together in Remarques sur les objections de M. Foucher 
(GP.IV.491-492/AG.147). 
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again, moves from a more unified (and more intelligible) entity type to a less unified (and less 
intelligible) entity type.11 
 Leibniz does not acknowledge the two senses of “world” explicitly, but the distinction 
between created and uncreated worlds does play a crucial and underappreciated role in his 
metaphysics, value theory, and cosmology. It is well recognized that, for Leibniz, there is at most 
one created world, and that God could have created in infinitely many different ways by 
selecting differently from the trove of essences in the divine mind. Catherine Wilson and Ohad 
Nachtomy go further, and recognize that essences combine into uncreated worlds in a very 
different way than substances combine into created worlds. Unfortunately, they do not take the 
next step, and recognize that this difference makes uncreated worlds into unified bearers of value 
in a way that created worlds cannot match. 
 Wilson develops a worlds-first theory of compossibility, drawing on the worlds-to-
essences operation described above. She writes, 
[. . .] our world, and every possible world, is in a sense, given in advance. To make a puzzle, 
we start with a photograph or drawing, glue it to a backing and the cut it up with a jigsaw. 
And this, I submit, is what Leibniz’s theory of the striving possibles comes to. The notion 
of a “world” conceptually precedes the notion of a substance, even though ontologically 
substances precede worlds [. . .] [Wilson 2000, 10] 
Her theory is motivated by the problem of premature worlds, or the thought that if Adam and 
Eve are compossible, then just Adam and Eve should constitute a world. If God starts out with 
complete worlds, then it makes sense that Adam and Eve can coexist only if they are joined by 
every other substance in the actual world. As will become apparent, my own view resolves this 
problem as well. 
                                               
11 There is another way to resolve this tension. Leibniz states immediately after the extended 
Theodicy passage that the operations of the divine mind are ordered by priority. The extraction 
operation is available only after God contemplates the individual possibles and constructs 
systems from them. This ordering of operations does not directly imply, however, that the 
objects operated upon are themselves ordered by priority relations in Leibniz’s paradigmatic 
sense. 
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 Wilson’s theory does not explain, however, why God creates exactly one world. As she 
writes, “substances can be incompossible, while their worlds are compossible.” To make matters 
worse, she adds that “a plurality of anything is prima facie a good in Leibniz’s system” (Wilson 
2000, 13). She concludes that Leibniz would have been more consistent if he had thought that 
there are multiple worlds, packing creation with more essence or perfection. Despite having the 
resources to reject it in her worlds-first theory, Wilson accepts the ATV and so faces the 
insoluble form of the problem of incompossibility, described more fully in Sect. 3. 
 In reply to Wilson, Nachtomy presents a theory in which uncreated worlds are prior to 
complete essences (including all relational predicates) but posterior to incomplete essences 
(including only monadic predicates) (Nachtomy 2001). His theory may be better equipped than 
Wilson’s to explain why God creates only one possible world, but Nachtomy does not use his 
theory to address this question. The answer I defend below uses the unity of each uncreated 
world to explain its appeal to the divine will. A group of uncreated worlds would lack this unity 
and so lack appeal; furthermore, willing the existence of such a group would require that God 
will multiple times, which Leibniz describes as unworthy of God’s wisdom. Nachtomy, in 
contrast, treats the creation of even a single world as a collection of distinct events: “Since the 
creation of the world reduces to actualizing the individuals that belong to the best world, the 
question of the actualization of the world can be narrowed down to that of individuals” 
(Nachtomy 2007, 124). Like Wilson, Nachtomy has the resources to explain compossibility, but 
unlike Wilson, he does not use these resources to take a position on why God does or does not 
create multiple worlds. 
 
3 Acosmism 
So far, I have argued that Leibniz conceives of worlds in two quite different ways, corresponding 
to the distinction between created substances and their essences, and that the uncreated worlds 
constructed from essences are intelligible unities in their own right and thus well suited to be the 
alternatives among which God chooses. In this section, I begin by putting aside the uncreated 
worlds in order to describe what divine choice would have to be like if God did in fact choose on 
the basis of the expected value of created worlds. 
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 I will argue that Leibniz’s ontology of aggregates commits him to a sort of acosmism, 
which in turn makes it puzzling why a God that chooses among created worlds would create 
more than one substance. The Additive Theory of Value (ATV) provides a way around this 
puzzle, but also requires that Leibniz’s notion of incompossibility fill a role that it cannot fill. 
The assumption that God chooses between aggregates provides strong support for the ATV, but 
at too high a cost. 
 
3.1 The Created World Is Not Real 
Acosmism is the view that there is no cosmos, or no world. The term “acosmism” was coined by 
Hegel to describe his non-atheistic interpretation of Spinoza. In the Hegel/Spinoza literature, it 
refers to the view that finite things have no reality.12 Leibniz’s acosmism is weaker, but closer to 
the etymological sense of the term. For Leibniz, finite substances are real, but the cosmos they 
compose is neither real nor a substance. More precisely, the cosmos they compose is not real 
through itself, but depends for its reality on a mind that coperceives its parts, or more precisely, 
on that mind’s one idea of the many substances—but this is what we are putting aside for the 
moment. 
 A quick route to acosmism is to adopt a limiting answer to the question, under what 
conditions is the union of some objects itself an object? If we take the view that there are only 
substances, and that the union of more than one substance is never itself a substance, we would 
answer, “Never.” Leibniz seems to have held this view about what is, and to have given the 
corresponding answer, at least outside of the Des Bosses Correspondence (1706–1716).13 Since 
God creates only substances, the only condition under which the union of these could itself be a 
substance is the limit case in which God creates exactly one—and Leibniz does say that each 
substance is like a world apart (A.VI.iv.1550/AG.47). 
 Leibniz’s substances are not dependent on each other. In fact, Leibniz holds that 
intersubstantial relations are not real, or at least not fully real: “Strictly speaking, one can say that 
no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any other thing” 
                                               
12 For more on the Hegelian sense of the term, see Hegel 1984, 1:432 and Melamed 2010, 80. 
13See Brandon Look and Paul Lodge’s introduction to their translation of the correspondence 
with Des Bosses (LR.xxxviii-lxxl). 
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(A.VI.iv.1647/AG.33). This island-like quality of substance is enough to keep the world itself 
from being a substance. If its parts are not really related, then it lacks the unity characteristic of 
substances. Alternately, if substances are independent of other substances, and if the world 
depends on its substantial parts, then the world cannot be a substance. 
 So perhaps Leibniz was an acosmist. He was at least pulled in that direction, and he does 
argue that the world is not a substance, that it lacks unity, that it is a phenomenon, and that it is 
not fully real. Leibniz writes in the lead-up to the Discourse on Metaphysics that 
A particular being is either a single substance, which is a complete being, one through itself (for 
example: God, a certain mind, a self), or else a real phenomenon (for example: a body, the world, 
the rainbow, or a pile of wood). We conceive of these on the model of a single complete substance 
[. . .] [A.VI.iv.559-560; my translation] 
It is striking that Leibniz includes the created world in this list. Piles of wood are a good example 
not only of aggregates, but of the type of being subject to sorites problems.14 Rainbows have an 
even more tenuous hold on reality, and Leibniz describes them as imaginary even when writing 
at an ontological register in which bodies, such as the sun, are taken as fully real (A.VI.iv.1506). 
 Nevertheless, Leibniz seems to grant the created world some ontological heft. At least in 
this passage, it appears under the genus of particular being. It is not merely an aggregate, but 
rather a real phenomenon, not a substance but conceived of on the model of substance. Even this, 
though, does not accord the aggregate its own reality, as though the world were a real 
phenomenon through itself. If the world has any reality at all, it is only through the constructive 
act of some mind to which it appears as a unity. In this passage, Leibniz assigns this work to 
human beings: we conceive of the aggregate on the model of a single complete substance. 
 This introduces some extra nuance to the term, “created world.” In the strict sense, it 
refers to more than one thing at once. In another, it refers to that plurality insofar as it has been 
conceived or experienced phenomenally as a unity, that is, insofar as the plurality has been 
unified by an idea (its corresponding uncreated world). In both senses, however, the created 
world has less unity and hence less reality than any one substance. 
                                               
14 Leibniz tended toward an eliminativist or nihilist position on such entities. See Levey 2002. 
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3.2 Why Create More Than One Substance? 
If the created world is less real than any substance, it is also less perfect, because degree of 
metaphysical perfection is at least directly correlated with degree of reality. In some formulations 
it just is reality: “perfection [is] nothing but the magnitude of positive reality considered as such, 
setting aside the limits or bounds in the things which have it” (GP.VI.613/AG.218). Given this 
and the divine aim to maximize the perfection of creation, it is difficult to see why God is 
concerned about worlds at all, or how it is that creating an aggregate of substances is an optimal 
course of action for God. 
 This difficulty may be sharpened into a puzzle. Say God creates the best of all possible 
worlds, indeed, this very world. This world is an aggregate of substances, and so less perfect than 
any single substance. God would have created something better, then, by creating just one 
substance, Adam, rather than by creating Adam and Eve as well. The puzzle is that, apparently, 
God cannot maximize the perfection of creation by creating the best world, or that God loses out 
by creating more than one thing. 
 
3.3 The ATV And Who Accepts It 
There appears to be an easy, Leibnizian way around this puzzle. Do not take Leibniz’s phrase 
“best of all possible worlds” literally. That is, do not insist that the created world itself has some 
superlative value. Instead, find value in what God actually creates: substances. If God creates 
one substance, then God has created one thing of great value. If God creates two, then God has 
created two things of great value and so done twice as well, etc. According to this way of 
avoiding the puzzle, the mistake is to assume that when God creates two substances God thereby 
creates one further thing of low value: a world, or the aggregate composed of those sub- stances. 
Since aggregates are plural, God creates exactly as many things as there are created substances, 
and the only way to compute their total value is by addition. 
 This approach follows the most accessible model of value combination, and it clearly 
works for the simplest cases, such as the monetary value of a heap of currency or the caloric 
value of a bag of chips. Also, Leibniz does seem to assume this model when he writes that “God 
makes the maximum of things he can, and what obliges him to seek simple laws is precisely the 
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necessity to find place for as many things as can be put together” (A.II.i.725/L.211). Here, 
picking the best possible world just seems to be a matter of picking the most heavily populated 
world. 
 Olli Koistinen and Arto Repo (Koistinen and Repo 1999, 197), Jeffrey McDonough 
(McDonough 2010, 137), and Michael Griffin (Griffin 2013, 109) all make this assumption 
about how to compute the value of the world from the value of its components. They suggest that 
it is Leibniz’s version of the medieval view that goodness and being are convertible. It appears 
most explicitly, however, in two other interpreters. Lloyd Strickland writes, “I would concur 
with George Gale’s analysis that the total perfection of the world at any given moment is the sum 
of the perfection of every substance in the world at that moment” (Strickland 2006, 115). Gale, 
in turn, offers a precise mathematical formula for calculating the perfection of worlds (Gale 1976, 
75). 
 I have already introduced this way of determining the value of an aggregate as the 
Additive Theory of Value (ATV): the value of an aggregate is the sum of the values of its 
components. The ATV does have intuitive appeal and textual support, as well as a nice chiastic 
structure: the perfection of a mereological sum is the sum of its constituents’ perfections. Also, it 
appears to explain why Leibniz’s God would create a world of many substances rather than just 
one substance, even given Leibniz’s tendency toward acosmism. 
 Really though, the ATV sits poorly with Leibniz’s acosmist tendencies, because the 
independence of substances that supports acosmism is relevant in a way that the independence of 
bills or chips is not. In determining the caloric value of the bag of chips, we need not respect the 
separateness of the chips. They may as well be one big chip, or a crushed mess. Something 
similar is true of the bills, although they cannot be physically combined in the same way as the 
chips. How the bills divide up the total value of the heap makes no difference to that value. 
These cases have in common a measure of value from the point of view of which it does not 
matter where one unit begins and another ends. The chips and the bills may be loose and separate, 
but this is irrelevant to their caloric or monetary value. 
 This measure allows the value of a part to be transferred to the whole, for the whole 
shares with its parts the relevant value making properties. This is not so for Leibnizian 
substances and the aggregates they compose. Substances are valuable precisely because of their 
independence, or because of their per se unity, which in turn explains their independence. The 
16 
 
mereological sum of these units lacks that independence, and so it lacks value. For Leibniz, there 
can be no measure of metaphysical perfection that is indifferent to the distinctions between value 
contributors, or that allows the transfer of value from part to whole. 
 The point about independence is the principal argument against the ATV, but there is 
another, more speculative, argument as well. Chips and bills are fungible.15 So far as their value 
is concerned, they are interchangeable without loss with equally valuable items of the same kind. 
One should be indifferent between two bills of the same value, and so long as caloric value is the 
only consideration, between two chips of the same caloric value. If the ATV is true and if God 
chooses among aggregates, then God should be similarly indifferent between two created worlds 
that differ only through the exchange of substances of like intrinsic value. That is, the ATV 
implies that substances are fungible. But there is reason to think that at least some paradigmatic 
Leibnizian substances are not fungible. Some substances, in particular human persons, are 
worthy of the sort of love that involves particular attachment, and this sort of particular 
attachment is not compatible with indifference in a choice between persons, even if they have the 
same degree of intrinsic value. 
 This is perhaps controversial, but Leibniz does describe God as having a particular 
relationship to at least created minds. For example, at the close of the Monadology, he writes that 
the capacity of created minds to mirror God directly 
makes minds capable of entering into a kind of society with God, and allows him to be, in relation 
to them, not only what an inventor is to his machine (as God is in relation to the other creatures) 
but also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children. [GP.VI.621/AG. 
223-224] 
There is too little here to fully support the fungibility argument against the ATV, but we have at 
least a strong suggestion that the sort of value God finds at least in minds is not compatible with 
indifference between substances of like intrinsic value, and hence not compatible with 
indifference between created worlds that differ only through the substitution of such substances. 
 The broader point is that evaluating uncreated worlds rather than created worlds may 
enable God to form more intimate relationships with particular created substances. If God 
evaluates uncreated worlds, then God would be in a position to delight in the created world by 
                                               
15 The argument from fungibility is adapted from Richard Yetter Chappell 2013. 
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considering it insofar as it is unified by a divine idea and to delight directly in each created 
substance, valuing each as its own perfection requires. Substituting one substance for another 
would be a double loss, first by confusing the ideal relations between substances that secure the 
unity of the uncreated world, and second by removing a particular object of divine love. 
 The full development of this argument from fungibility would require an interpretation of 
Leibniz on love. The first question would be: is particular attachment of the sort described above 
compatible with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), and in particular, with the Identity of 
Indiscernibles? There is some indication that Leibniz thought substances were individuated by 
their degree of metaphysical perfection (see, for example, A.VI.iv.1352). If this is so, then there 
is a reason, independent of all question of fungibility, why God cannot be indifferent between 
substances of like value. Even if there can be substances of like value, it would still need to be 
explained why the PSR does not require indifference between them.16 
 In addition to these arguments, there is direct textual evidence against the ATV. Leibniz 
is well known for arguing, in an aesthetic key, that a beautiful whole might require ugly or 
jarring parts. We should take this as a serious metaphysical possibility as well, and as a challenge 
to the ATV. A given substance may contribute to the perfection of the world not by adding its 
own portion of perfection, but by way of its imperfection. That is, the contribution that any given 
substance makes to the perfection of its world may be distinct from that substance’s own 
perfection, and depend instead on that substance’s relations to its worldmates. 
 Leibniz says this, though without mentioning substances, in what may be the clearest 
rejection of the ATV: 
For one unimportant thing added to another can often produce something better than can two 
things added together which are in themselves more precious than either of the others. 
[Guh.I.412/L.368] 
In a more familiar context, in which the relation between substances and worlds is more clearly 
at issue, he comes almost as close: 
                                               
16 For a guide to some of Leibniz’s thoughts on love relevant to this argument, see Parkinson 
1994, 211. 
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But one might have added that God has produced indeed the most perfect whole that was possible, 
one wherewith he had full cause for satisfaction, the imperfections of the parts serving a greater 
perfection in the whole. [GP.VI.407/H.414] 
Those who attribute the ATV to Leibniz cannot take these passages to be making a fundamental 
metaphysical point about value. But there is no reason to assume that Leibniz restricted his point 
to phenomena and aesthetic experience. 
 
3.4 Incompossibility And Its Problems 
Worse still, the ATV has a strange consequence when combined with a best possible world 
theodicy. At the very least, it supplies God with a decisive reason to create infinitely many 
substances, and with suitable adjustment to distinguish between the value of two aggregates each 
with infinitely many members,17 it supplies God with a reason to create every possible substance. 
Not surprisingly, the interpreters who implicitly or explicitly endorse the ATV also ask why God 
creates a world at all or just one world, if creating just one world means not creating some things 
God could have created.18 
 For example, Griffin proposes this as a problem for his own interpretation: “If substances 
are intrinsically compossible and each is possessed of some quantity of essence, and the greatest 
quantity of essence must exist, then it seems that all possibles must exist” (Griffin 2013, 108). 
Several other recent authors on incompossibility conclude with exasperated questions addressed 
to Leibniz or to other interpreters. Koistinen and Repo ask, “Leibniz clearly regards as absurd the 
                                               
17 Leibniz thought that there were infinitely many possible substances, and there are infinite 
subsets of infinite sets. On the assumption that each substance in any given infinite set has a 
value greater than some specified lower limit, it would be impossible to compare two created 
worlds each with infinitely many substances using the ATV. Probably, there is way to put the 
summing view that avoids this problem. For a discussion of the difficulty in comparing worlds 
each with infinitely many substances, see Brown 2006, 108-109. 
18 Leibniz does forcibly and repeatedly assert and argue that there are merely possible substances. 
For example, “there are an infinity of possible things which, nevertheless, do not exist” 
(A.VI.iv.1445/AG.19). 
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suggestion that God could choose more than one world and give existence to them all. But why” 
(Koistinen and Repo 1999, 214)? Jeffrey McDonough as well as Jan Cover and John O’Leary-
Hawthorne use the same question to reject rival accounts of incompossibility (Cover and 
O’Leary-Hawthorne 1999, 140). As McDonough puts the question: “Why doesn’t God create 
other worlds as well as the actual world? [. . .] Why does God realize a world instead of some 
more inclusive creation” (McDonough 2010, 142n12)? 
 Interpreters answer this question in various ways, though most often without full 
satisfaction in their own answers, especially if they have interpreted incompossibility as a world-
making relation, a relation that rules out the coexistence of certain substances within one world 
but does not rule out the coexistence of multiple worlds. 
 For example, Griffin develops what I take to be a very nearly correct account of 
incompossibility, but then notes that his account fails to fully explain why God does not create 
multiple worlds. He proposes an unexplained (and so not Leibnizian) coincidence between 
distinct sources or sorts of value as the answer: 
For it to be the case, on this reading, that God has created just one world—the best of all possible 
worlds—it would have to be the case that the creation which brings about the optimal balance of 
richness of phenomena to the simplicity of decrees exactly coincides with the maximal collection 
of harmonizing substances. Recent scholarship suggests that Leibniz accepted this coincidence. 
[Griffin 2013, 110] 
Other interpreters develop an account of incompossibility from the available sources, then note 
that the account fails to explain why God creates just one world, and conclude by raising this as a 
problem for Leibniz. Koistinen and Repo do this. McDonough does too, though his case is more 
subtle. The notion comparable to “world” in his theory is the receptive capacity of a given 
spatiotemporal structure. If this sort of structure drops out of Leibniz’s late, more thoroughly 
idealist metaphysics, then there would be nothing to keep God from realizing the aim to create 
every possible substance (McDonough 2010, 161). 
 Still other interpreters ignore the question and the assumption behind it, assuming instead 
that God creates exactly one world and arguing that only certain aggregates of substances 
compose a world. But without an alternative to the ATV, they remain vulnerable: why create a 
world if that is not the best way to create maximally? Rutherford and Messina’s article is the 
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clearest instance of this strategy, and the target for McDonough’s question cited above (Messina 
and Rutherford 2009). 
 The ATV, if true, would explain why God creates an aggregate less perfect than any one 
substance, but it overshoots by implying that God creates every possible substance. The only 
way to save the ATV and incompossibility together would be to uncover some factor that either 
blocks or restricts God’s aim, something in addition to the mutually independent created 
substances and their individual values. At the beginning of the paper I called this factor the 
tertium quid and denied that there is any such thing. Here I will be more careful: there is no need 
to continue the search if that search is driven by the ATV and if the ATV is not relevant to God’s 
choice at creation. 
 Without the ATV, we need a new explanation for why God creates an aggregate, or a 
new way of relating the value of a world to the values of its parts. I propose that we read 
“possible worlds” in “God has chosen the best of all possible worlds” (GP.VI.210/H.232) as 
referring to uncreated worlds or ways God could create, because God may perceive their value 
directly, without addition. The value of an uncreated world takes into account the values of the 
individual substances God would create, but only indirectly, because the independently valued 
idea of the world includes the ideas of these substances. On this proposal, God creates an 
aggregate rather than a single substance only if the idea expressing the aggregate has greater 
perfection than the idea expressing the single substance. This may be true even if the single 
substance has greater perfection than the aggregate, because as already described, there is a 
significant gap in unity and in metaphysical perfection between an aggregate and the idea of that 
aggregate. 
 Since Leibniz has another way to explain why God would create an aggregate rather than 
a single substance, the ATV loses its strongest support. By avoiding the ATV, Leibniz also 
avoids the problem of incompossibility, or at least the insoluble version of that problem that calls 
for a tertium quid. God aims to create in the most perfect way, and that way is the most perfect 
uncreated world. Since each uncreated world is itself a subject of perfection, there is no reason to 
assume that adding another essence would yield another uncreated world of greater perfection. 
On the summing view, W plus S is better than W alone, because the value of W plus S is just the 
value of W plus the value of S. That is the best we can do if “W” and “S” range over created 
worlds and substances, respectively. If, instead, they range over uncreated worlds and essences, 
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there is no such principle. The value of W plus S may be greater or lesser than the value of W, 
depending on which substance S expresses and on which substances W expresses. 
 The alternative to the ATV may be called the Unitary Theory of Value. This theory is 
less readily captured in a formula, because any such formula could not refer to value without 
circularity. The ATV provides a function from the value of many things to the value of one thing 
without providing a metaphysical account of why the many are valuable. Rejecting the ATV and 
other similarly structured theories (for example, a multiplicative theory of value) amounts to 
requiring that valuable things be the source of their own value. That is, unlike the ATV, the 
Unitary Theory of Value would have to actually be a theory of value, or of metaphysical 
perfection. 
 It is sufficient for present purposes to claim that the formula for the Unitary Theory of 
Value would appeal to unity-in-variety, or to harmony.19 The value of an uncreated world would 
depend on the way in which a variety of essences is unified, or on the specific manner in which 
the component essences relate to each other in forming a single encompassing idea. This would 
explain the gap in value between an aggregate and its idea: the idea is many-in-one and the 
aggregate is just many. 
 Understanding world evaluation in this way renders God’s aim to maximize perfection 
compatible with Leibniz’s insistence that there are merely possible substances, and it does this 
without supplying an obstacle to God’s creative aim. The simplest reason why this is so is just 
that maximizing perfection turns out not to mean maximizing the number of substances. More 
deeply, the problem of incompossibility does not arise, at least in its difficult contemporary form, 
because there is no need to treat existing substances as the ground of the world’s perfection, and 
so no need to treat them as a unity, which Leibniz’s acosmism disallows. 
 
4 Acosmism Resisted 
In the previous section, I argued that the ATV would be relevant if God did choose on the basis 
of the expected value of created worlds, and that if the ATV is relevant, then incompossibility 
relations must function as an obstacle to God’s creative aim. I also argued that incompossibility 
                                               
19 I discuss the relation between harmony and perfection in Section 4.1. 
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relations would not have this problematic role if God chooses among uncreated worlds. This 
final section offers a positive account of divine deliberation between uncreated worlds, and 
sketches the alternative approach to incompossibility based on this account. 
 The fundamental insight is that divine wisdom requires God to will exactly once in 
creation. So, taking divine wisdom into account, God can create both Adam and Eve only if 
God’s reason to create Adam (or Eve) is also a reason to create Eve (or Adam). Adam and Eve 
are compossible if and only if there is one reason to create them both. Since divine reasons to 
create arise from the value of divine ideas, or from their capacity to attract God’s will, Adam and 
Eve are compossible if and only if there is one idea—or one uncreated world—that includes the 
essence of Adam and the essence of Eve. 
 This interpretation of incompossibility avoids the search for a tertium quid that restricts 
God’s aim, because it construes the wisest or most appealing way to create as a limited whole, 
not as an unlimited sum of independent wholes. However, the interpretation does raise some 
problems of its own. First, it may seem to present Leibniz as concerned more about the 
perfection of God’s action in creating and less about the perfection of what God chooses—but 
divine wisdom should guide God to create the greatest amount of reality or perfection possible, 
not place restrictions on the number of times that God wills. Second, if the divine will is attracted 
by the value of an idea, it may seem that God lacks a motive to create. Why not just enjoy the 
idea? Would the created world, being an aggregate, not be a disappointment compared to its 
ideal image? Third, certain passages from the mid-1680s suggest that there is a divine idea 
corresponding to any combination of essences whatsoever, and so a reason to create for every 
combination of substances. If true, then my interpretation would be vacuous, implying that every 
combination of substances is compossible. 
 After presenting the interpretation directly, I address these objections in turn, and 
conclude (1) that Leibniz considers ways to create as themselves objects of divine choice, (2) 
that for an omnipotent will to be maximally attracted to a way to do something involves doing 
that thing, and (3) that the passages in question are best read in a way compatible with the 
present interpretation. 
23 
 
 
4.1 Wisdom and Willing Once 
In a letter to de Volder, Leibniz is careful to distinguish between substances, which are loose and 
separate, and the ideas or concepts of substances, which are mutually dependent: 
In my opinion, of course, there is nothing in the universe of created things that does not need the 
concept of every other thing in the universe for its perfect concept, since each thing influences 
every other in such a way that, if it were imagined that that thing were removed or different, 
everything in the world would be different from what it is now. [LDV.208–209] 
The problem of incompossibility has proven so difficult because any substance can coexist with 
any other substance, so far as the substances themselves are concerned. They are causally and 
metaphysically independent. The solution is to consider incompossibility as a relation that holds 
in virtue of two factors: the relations among concepts or essences of substances, and God’s 
wisdom, which groups essences into ideal unities held together by just these relations. These 
ideal unities, constructed by divine wisdom, appeal directly to God’s will. A groups of essences 
that does not constitute such a unity does not appeal to the divine will, or rather, each of the 
essences appeals separately as a distinct way to create. 
 This solution involves taking certain divine features into account and excluding others. If 
only God’s power is taken into account, then all substances are compossible, because it is within 
God’s power to create one substance, and another, and so on without limit. If every aspect of 
God is taken into account, then only the substances in the actual world are compossible with 
each other, because God can create only the best, or what God has in fact created. Leibniz 
reserves the term “incompossible” and its opposite for some middle ground, in which we take 
into account more than just divine power and less than everything about God.20 
                                               
20 This strategy was inspired by Robert Adams’s note that understanding hypothetical necessity 
involves drawing “the right line between attributes of God that are, and that are not, to be taken 
into account in the basic concepts of possible worlds” (Adams 1994, 20). Samuel Newlands 
richly develops a similar idea in Newlands 2010. 
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 I propose that the right middle ground takes into account just divine power and divine 
wisdom, but not the full extent of divine goodness. It is worth repeating part of the extended 
quote from the Theodicy, though with different words emphasized: 
By this means the divine Wisdom distributes all the possibles it had already contemplated 
separately, into so many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other. The 
result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the best from among all these 
possible systems, which wisdom makes in order to satisfy goodness completely; and such is 
precisely the plan of the universe as it is. [GP.VI.252/H.271; my emphasis] 
God’s wisdom is responsible for the mental operation described above that moves from separate 
essences to uncreated worlds. It also responsible for choosing the best of these uncreated worlds, 
though this responsibility arises only in relation to the full extent of God’s goodness. 
 Each of the uncreated worlds is a way to create that satisfies divine wisdom, but only one 
of them satisfies divine wisdom and fully satisfies divine goodness. That is, God could be faulted 
for a lack of wisdom if God were to create a set of substances that is not unified by an idea that 
includes the essences of all and only those substances. But God could not be faulted for creating 
the substances corresponding to any one of the uncreated worlds except by pointing out that a 
different uncreated world has greater value. A conceptually disorganized creation may be found 
lacking internally, but a conceptually organized creation may be found lacking only through 
comparison with something external. The distinctions between wisdom and goodness and 
between internal and comparative criticism ground an exhaustive distinction between sets of 
essences or substances. Those without internal faults satisfy wisdom and are compossible; those 
with internal faults do not and are incompossible.21 
 The internal fault in question is a lack of unity, which is a fault because having unity is a 
necessary condition for being metaphysically perfect. This is so because unity is one aspect of 
harmony,22 and harmony, in turn, is metaphysical perfection insofar as the subject of perfection 
                                               
21 Both internal and external faults would be grounded in relations, either among the essences 
that compose an uncreated world or between two uncreated worlds. These relations would be 
ideal or mind-dependent, as per Leibniz’s theory of relations, but then again the relata would be 
as well. 
22 See, for example, GP.VII.87/L.426. 
25 
 
relates to a mind. As Leibniz writes, “[h]armony is the perfection of thinkable things insofar as 
they are thinkable” (A.VI.iv.1359/SLT.191). Since we are considering uncreated worlds, which 
are ideas in the mind of God, harmony is the relevant sort of metaphysical perfection. If I am 
right so far about divine choice, God compares uncreated worlds not insofar as they express an 
aggregate, but insofar as they are thinkable, for this is the respect in which they have a degree of 
unity-in-variety, or harmony, or metaphysical perfection adequate to explain why creating a 
world is the optimal course of action for God. Being unified in an intelligible way is a necessary 
condition for any set of essences to satisfy divine wisdom, and so to count as a compossible set, 
or an uncreated world.  
 Taking into account divine wisdom but not divine goodness amounts to asking which 
creation scenarios would display a unified plan, or a single reason to create, without asking 
which of these plans is best. There are numerous passages throughout Leibniz’s work in which 
he asserts that each created substance expresses every other created substance, and so expresses 
the universe as a whole. 23  These passages provide weak but persistent support for this 
interpretation of incompossibility, because they require that at least the best world enjoys a sort 
of ideal unity, in which a single mind could generate one idea of the whole by noting the 
coordination of the parts. 
 Occasionally, Leibniz asserts the unity of God’s idea of the world even more explicitly: 
[if] we could express by a formula of a higher Characteristic some essential property of the 
universe, we could read from it all the successive states of every part of the universe at all 
assigned times. [. . .] Therefore I think I have good reasons for believing that all the different 
classes of beings whose assemblage forms the universe are, in the ideas of God who knows 
distinctly their essential gradations, only like so many ordinates of the same curve. [BC.II.557-
558/W.185-187] 
 
For me, nothing is permanent in [substances] except the very law that involves [their] continued 
succession, which in individual things corresponds to the law that is in the whole universe. 
[LDV.288-289] 
                                               
23 See, for example, Discourse on Metaphysics Sect. 9, Leibniz’s letter to De Volder of 20 June 
1703 (LDV.266-267), and the Monadology Sects. 56–58. 
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Leibniz is explicit in the first passage that the idea of the world as a whole is a unity that includes 
the ideas of every particular substance. In creating, God need not respond separately to the 
perfection of each individual essence, but only once to the perfection of one more encompassing 
idea. The second passage enforces this thought: the unchanging law which lays out the pattern of 
change in any one substance corresponds to a broader unchanging law that determines change 
throughout the universe, or in every created substance. If Leibniz remained true to his acosmist 
tendency, then this law does not make the created world into a substance. Rather, the universal 
law is an idea in God, an aspect of the uncreated world. To have (or to be) a single law, the 
uncreated world must be something more than just a collection of essences; it must enjoy a unity 
at least analogous to the unity of any substance. 
 The strongest support for this view of divine choice comes from passages in which 
Leibniz links the unity of uncreated worlds with divine wisdom. Here is the pithiest such passage: 
it is obvious that God chose from an infinite number of possible individuals those he thought most 
in accord with the supreme and hidden ends of his wisdom [. . .] [A.VI.iv.1646/AG.32] 
Adam is created along with Eve, and not along with some other first woman, because, considered 
together, Adam and Eve satisfy divine wisdom—not because Adam himself or his essence 
somehow prevents the existence of all first women except Eve. A few years later, in the 
correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz presents the same thought in much greater detail. 
 Early in their correspondence, Arnauld misread Leibniz. Leibniz had claimed that the 
existence of any one substance in the actual world requires the existence of every other substance 
in the actual world. This distressed Arnauld, and to refute Leibniz he presented him with a 
dilemma. Either this requirement holds in virtue of the substances themselves (in which case 
Leibniz would have to give up on the independence of substances), or else it holds in virtue of 
God’s free decrees (in which case it is not really a requirement). Arnauld writes: 
one must still ask (and this is the source of my difficulty) if the connexion between these objects 
(namely, Adam on the one hand, and everything that was to happen to him and his posterity on the 
other) exists as such of itself, independently of all the free decrees of God, or if it was dependent 
upon them [. . .] [A.II.ii.34/LA.27-28] 
The connection Arnauld singles out is hypothetical necessity, whatever it is about the creation of 
Adam that guarantees the rest of the universe will be one way and not another. As Arnauld 
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protests to Leibniz in the same letter: “For on the contrary I never talk about anything there 
except hypothetical necessity” (A.II.ii.33/LA.26; Leibniz twice wrote “NB” in his copy beside 
this sentence). 
 With the added Leibnizian assumption that God creates every substance compossible 
with any substance that God creates, Arnauld’s relation turns out to be extensionally equivalent 
with, if not identical to, the compossibility relation.24 Say the existence of Adam hypothetically 
necessitates the existence of Eve. It follows that Adam and Eve are compossible. Going in the 
other direction we call on our extra assumption: if Adam and Eve are compossible, then if Adam 
exists so does Eve. With this in mind, we can reformulate Arnauld’s question. Does the 
compossibility relation between any two compossible substances exist as such of itself, 
independently of all free decrees of God, or is it dependent upon those decrees? 
 Leibniz rejects both approaches to compossibility: “I believe, then, that the dilemma of 
the double explanation which you propose allows of some middle way [. . .]” (A.II.ii.72/LA.56). 
Leibniz’s middle way appeals to the ideal relations between substances, and so to the relations 
between essences in God’s mind, and so ultimately to the unity of God’s ideas of certain 
collections of essences. As he concludes his reply to Arnauld, “[t]here is then only the hypothesis 
of the concomitance or harmony between substances which explains everything in a conceivable 
manner and one worthy of God” (A.II.ii.82/LA.65). The relations of fit among substances do not 
themselves ground hypothetical necessity, but they do provide the structure for God’s single 
concepts of multiple substances, which in turn explains why only certain groups of substances 
are worth creating.  
 Leibniz goes on to explain that the harmony or concomitance that explains hypothetical 
necessity (and so compossibility as well) is harmony among the free decrees that God would 
enact in creating certain collections of substances. That is, it is a harmony that unifies certain 
groups of essences into uncreated worlds and that would unify God’s will if God were to create 
the substances corresponding to such a group. In one striking sentence, Leibniz explains this to 
Arnauld: 
                                               
24 See, for example, Principium meum est, quicquid existere potest, et aliis compatibile est, id 
existere (A.VI.iii.581-582/L.168-169). 
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Thus all human events could not fail to occur as in fact they did occur, once the choice of Adam is 
assumed; but not so much because of the individual concept of Adam, although this concept 
contains them, but because of God’s plans, which also enter into this individual concept of Adam, 
and which determine that of this entire universe, and consequently both that of Adam and those of 
all the other individual substances of this universe, each individual substance being an expression 
of the whole universe, of which it is a part in accordance with a certain relationship, through the 
connexion that exists between all things, because of the interrelationships between God’s 
decisions or plans. [A.II.ii.73-74/LA.57] 
As the very end of this passage suggests, the connection between Adam and everything else is 
not generated by Adam directly, or even by Adam’s essence, but by the unity that God’s 
intentions would have only if, in creating Adam, God also creates certain other substances and 
no others. The interconnection between substances in the world is a consequence of the unity of 
God’s plan. As an approximation of Leibniz’s account of compossibility, two substances are 
compossible if and only if God can enact the free decrees associated with the complete concept 
of each by a unified act of will. 
 Arnauld might well ask, at this point, how Leibniz’s middle way is not just the second 
horn of his dilemma, that the hypothetical necessitation connecting Adam and Eve is a 
consequence of God’s free decrees. To reply, Leibniz could explain that God does not will 
Adam’s existence and then will, in addition, that Eve exist if Adam does. The harmony of divine 
volitions is not built piecemeal in this way, but is rather a direct response to a unity already 
fashioned by divine wisdom. Leibniz writes: 
one can even say that these particular acts of will differ from the will in general only by a simple 
relationship, and more or less as the situation of a town looked at from a certain viewpoint differs 
from its ground plan [. . .] [A.II.ii.18-19/LA.15] 
This is the “perspectives” analogy in a fresh form.25 Here it is not directly about the created 
substances themselves and their place in the created world, or about essences as parts of an 
uncreated world, but about the acts of will involved in creating multiple substances. This use of 
the analogy highlights the way in which each uncreated world, in virtue of its conceptual unity, 
elicits one response from the divine will. The collection of metaphysically independent existing 
substances form a whole with some degree of reality only because God conceives of them within 
                                               
25 Compare, for example, Monadology Sect. 57 (GP.VI.616/AG.220). 
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one concept, which in turn enables God to will the free decrees associated with each in a single 
but multi-aspected act. 
 One might object that this account still allows God to make many different acts of will, 
each one exhibiting this sort of unity. If God can do this, then substances with essences in 
distinct uncreated worlds are compossible and I am wrong about compossibility. This objection 
does not succeed, because, on Leibniz’s view, God cannot do this and remain wise. God wills 
once because God is maximally wise and  
indeed the wiser one is, the fewer separate acts of will one has and the more one’s views and acts 
of will are comprehensive and linked together. And each particular act of will contains a 
connexion with all the others, so that they may be harmonized to the greatest possible degree. 
[A.II.ii.19/LA.15] 
If God is wise, then God wills once and whatever God creates displays the unity of a single idea. 
There are many ways for God to do this, corresponding to the many sets of essences assembled 
by divine wisdom—but choosing more than one such way would defeat the purpose.26 
 The same point may be put in terms of the object of choice. The value of uncreated 
worlds does not sum for the reason that the value of substances does not sum, because the value 
attractive to God derives from unity. The value of several uncreated worlds would sum only if 
there were some unity composed of these uncreated worlds, but in this case, that whole would 
itself would be an uncreated world, a collection of essences thinkable in one idea. The object of 
divine choice cannot be multiple without decreasing its value, and the act of divine willing 
cannot be multiple without diminishing divine wisdom. 
 We now have a more detailed answer to the question that plagues interpretations of 
compossibility based on the ATV: “Why doesn’t God create other worlds as well as the actual 
world? […] Why does God realize a world instead of some more inclusive creation” 
(McDonough 2010, 142n12)? God chooses among uncreated worlds not because God’s will to 
perfection is constrained, but because uncreated worlds are unities, and so have harmony or 
metaphysical perfection, which appeals to the divine will. God creates exactly one of these 
because creating two or more would involve two different acts of will, in response to two distinct 
                                               
26 For more on the wisdom and the economy of volitions, see the Conversation sur la liberte et le 
destin (Grua.481-482/SLT.99) and the Theodicy (GP.VI.240/H.206). 
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sources of value—and this would be unwise. Put in terms of the object of value, the essences 
taken from two or more uncreated worlds do not compose a unity with its own value. 
 Certain essences combine into wholes with at least as much unity, and therefore at least 
as much metaphysical perfection, as their parts. These wholes, or the uncreated worlds, define 
the sets of compossible substances because they are the ways to create that would display God’s 
wisdom. 
 
4.2 Objection: Ways as Objects 
Leibniz is very clear about his approach to the Euthyphro dilemma: 
Someone will say God is the cause of things, and therefore is the cause of the goodness which is in 
them. Therefore his will is prior to the goodness of things. The response is easy: God is the cause 
of the existence of things, but not of their essence, and to that extent he will also be the cause of 
the existence of the good, but not of the goodness which he discovers in the essence itself when 
thinking about it. [A.VI.iv.1362/SLT.193-194] 
God’s will is not prior to the goodness of things, rather, God’s will responds to found goodness. 
Leibniz even strengthens this, by implying in his account of freedom that the goodness of an act 
of will depends on the ideal goodness of its object: 
From this it is evident that an absolute will, not dependent on the goodness of things, is monstrous. 
On the contrary, there is no permissive will in an omniscient being, except insofar as God 
conforms himself to the ideality itself of things, i.e., to what is best. [CP.4-5] 
Leibniz again very clearly applies this to the evaluation of the world: 
the excellence of God’s works can be recognized by considering them in themselves, even when 
we do not reflect on this empty external denomination which relates them to their cause. This is all 
the more true, since it is by considering his works that we can discover the creator. His works 
must therefore carry his mark in themselves. [A.VI.iv.1532/AG.36] 
The goodness or desirability of creation is to be explained in terms of the perfection of the things 
created, or more accurately, in terms of the joint perfection of their essences in God’s intellect. 
That goodness should not be explained in terms of any relation to God’s will. 
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 This seems to contradict the interpretation of incompossibility offered above. We started 
out evaluating objects of will as candidates for creation, as required by the Euthyphro dilemma, 
but found ourselves taking into account formal features of the way in which God wills. Given the 
passages just quoted, it seems that the number of times that God wills should not enter into any 
determination of the value of what God wills. That value is fixed prior to any volitional 
engagement. 
 A full response to this objection would carefully delimit the activity of wisdom, which 
bridges that of will and intellect. My interpretation defines compossibility as the relation between 
substances that can coexist if we take into account only God’s power, intellect, and wisdom. 
Taking wisdom into account led us to discuss ways in which God might will, either wisely in a 
single act or unwisely in multiple acts. To avoid the objection, I must explain the structure and 
corresponding wiseness of divine acts of will entirely in terms of God’s intellect and its contents. 
Such an explanation would allow us to use the unity of God’s will as a guide to the value of what 
God creates, but would remove any implication that the unity of God’s will explains the value of 
what God creates. The objects of God’s will would ground their own value, and the will’s 
response to various objects would merely be a reliable guide to that value. 
 I will only make two restricted points toward this full response. First, as argued in Sect. 2, 
Leibniz sometimes treats ways to will as objects of the intellect. The individual essences and the 
uncreated worlds are firmly located in the divine intellect, but nevertheless may be considered as 
ways for God to create. They express what it would be for particular substances or whole created 
worlds to exist, and so function as plans for creation. Whether God wills once or multiple times 
is therefore a function of the unity of God’s plan. Since the unity of God’s plan is also an aspect 
of that plan’s perfection, it makes sense to say that the wisdom of God’s willing is a function of 
the perfection of what God wills—and not the reverse.  
 Second, Leibniz defines wisdom as the intellectual power most directly relevant to the 
will. That is, wisdom is knowledge about good and evil: 
The end of goodness is the greatest good. But to recognize this we need wisdom, which is merely 
the knowledge of the good [. . .]. Thus wisdom is in the understanding, and goodness is in the will. 
[. . .] [M.48/L.564] 
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Leibniz cannot literally mean that goodness is in the will, as we have just read his firm 
declaration that the will responds to the goodness of essences. Instead, he seems to mean that 
achieving the good is proper to the will. Goodness is the will’s end. The intellect’s end, however, 
is knowledge, including knowledge of the good. Wisdom is this knowledge of the good, or the 
intellect insofar as it orients the will to particular goods. Taking only divine power and wisdom 
into account should not require us to use God’s will to determine the value of anything 
creatable—but if wisdom steers the will, it should allow us to use the structure of God’s willing 
as a guide to the value of worlds. That the will responds to an object in a certain way is a 
criterion of its goodness, but not the essence of its goodness. 
 
4.3 Objection: Why Create at All? 
A perhaps more devastating objection concerns God’s motivation to create anything at all. The 
created world is an aggregate unsuited to explain why creating a world is the optimal course of 
action for God. Only the uncreated world, or a divine idea, has the unity that metaphysical 
perfection requires, and so only an uncreated world can explain why creating a world is God’s 
best option. But why should God bother with created worlds at all? Why not simply respond to 
the best uncreated world by admiring it? After all, the created world would be something of a 
disappointment compared to God’s motivation for creating it. 
 To begin, the created world would not be a disappointment, because, if God creates at all, 
God could not have done any better than create an aggregate of substances. This would come as 
no surprise to God, and without surprise there is no disappointment. This beginning only deepens 
the problem, though, because God may be expected to have known better than to create an 
aggregate. If the aggregate’s value does not compare with the value of its ideal image, then there 
is apparently no reason to create. Indeed, Leibniz wrote fairly early in his career that “[t]he 
harmony of things is something ideal, i.e., it is already to be seen in the possibles” (CP.100-101). 
The possibles seem to need no supplement from actuals.  
 I am not sure how best to answer this objection. At worst, I might conclude that Leibniz 
would have been more consistent if he had claimed that God does not create at all. In Sects. 2 
and 3.4, I objected to various interpreters—including Wilson, Koistinen, Repo, and (perhaps) 
McDonough—who conclude that Leibniz would have been more consistent if he had allowed for 
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the creation of multiple worlds. They fault Leibniz for failing to adequately address a glaring 
trilemma: commitment to unactualized possibles, the independence of substances, and God’s will 
to maximize perfection. My own interpretation shows that Leibniz did address this trilemma, by 
replacing the ATV with a unified theory of value for worlds. The present objection attributes a 
slightly more subtle inconsistency to Leibniz: God’s way of selecting a best world seems to leave 
God with no reason to create, but Leibniz insists that God does create and with reason. If this 
inconsistency is indeed more subtle, it would be more charitable to say that Leibniz should have 
rejected creation than to say that he should have accepted the plurality of worlds. 
 But rather than accept the objection, I would suggest that it carries too far the restriction 
on divine attributes suggested above. Taking into account only divine power and wisdom 
partitions the individual essences into groups, each of which satisfies wisdom. If power and 
wisdom were God’s only attributes, then God would be content simply to admire these groups 
and to admire one of them the most. God also has a will, though, and the will responds to value 
through action. As Leibniz writes, “[…] the will is the thinking about good and evil together with 
the endeavour to act […]” (A.VI.iv.1361/SLT.193). This definition of will seems to encroach on 
the act of divine wisdom described in Sect. 4.2, but Leibniz is quick to add that 
if anyone should prefer to say that the will is not the judgement of good and evil, but is the very 
endeavour to act which follows immediately from the judgement, I shall not dispute with him 
provided that he recognizes that the endeavour arises from the judgement. [ibid.] 
Divine wisdom makes a judgment concerning the content of God’s intellect, but this admiring 
judgment does not exhaust God’s capacity to engage with the good. Since the uncreated worlds 
are plans, or ways for finite things to be, God also engages with the good by acting according to 
plan.27 
 This response relies only on God’s nature and does not appeal to the value that God 
produces by creating. A reply based on produced value would be problematic, because that value 
would be the value of an aggregate and therefore greater if God creates more substances, as the 
ATV predicts. Still, it is worth noting that sharing is a praiseworthy response to excellence and 
that individual created substances share God’s vision of the uncreated world. 
                                               
27 Elizabeth Anscombe elaborates a similar conception, in which paradigmatic willing involves 
acting: “The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get […]” (Anscombe 2000, 68). 
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 Leibnizian substances are perceivers and, in a sense, omniscient perceivers. To be a 
Leibnizian substance is to be the subject of a unified series of perceptions, each one following 
from its predecessor in a lawlike way. The perceptions are (as) of the rest of the created world, 
and so grant the perceiver a sort of omniscience about the rest of the world. This falls short of 
true omniscience only because the perceptions are confused (see, for example, 
A.VI.iii.524/DSR.85). The law generating these perceptions is unique to each substance insofar 
as each substance’s perceptions are confused in a unique way. The law is common to all 
substances insofar as each is a member of the same created world. That law, insofar as it is 
common to all substances, corresponds to the uncreated world, or to the idea of the created world. 
God shares the best uncreated world by creating substances which imperfectly express that world 
by perceiving it in a unique but limited way (see, for example, A.II.ii.312/LA.170-171). 
 Some of these perceiving substances are rational perceivers. The rational members of the 
best of all possible worlds have the privilege of being, by nature, imperfect thinkers of the best of 
all possible ideas. Since thinking something involves some grasp of its ground, the rational 
perceivers have some recognition and appreciation of God. Creating the best of all possible 
worlds is a way of multiplying the idea of the world, of sharing its splendor, and of meriting the 
praise of its most perceptive members.28 
 
4.4 Objection: Vacuity 
The most troubling objection arises from two passages composed in 1686. These passages seem 
to imply that God has an idea corresponding to any combination of essences whatsoever, or that 
every collection of essences is an uncreated world. If the passages should be interpreted this way, 
then my account of compossibility is vacuous. Every set of essences would have unity and 
satisfy divine wisdom. 
 The first is in A Specimen of Discoveries about Marvellous Secrets: 
[…] just as no line can be drawn, with however casual a hand, which is not geometrical and has a 
certain constant nature, common to all its points, so also no possible series of things and no way of 
                                               
28 On these issues, see especially the Discourse on Metaphysics Sects. 14 & 35–36 
(A.VI.iv.1549–1550 & 1584–1587/AG.46–47 & 66–68). 
35 
 
creating the world can be conceived which is so disordered that it does not have its own fixed and 
determinate order and its laws of progression […] [A.VI.iv.1619/MP.78–79] 
To sustain the troubling interpretation, we would have to read “possible series of things” and 
“way of creating the world” maximally broadly, to include every combination of substances that 
divine power could bring into existence. The rest of the passage would go on to say that each of 
these combinations has its “own fixed and determinate order” and its own law. Needless to say, I 
think that we should not read “series” and “way” this broadly. If these expressions refer to 
uncreated worlds, then the passage merely states that every uncreated world is well ordered or 
unified by a law. 
 On the narrow reading, the passage is less substantive than it seems. Leibniz is not 
making the striking claim that order is inevitable given just divine power. Instead, Leibniz only 
claims that God groups essences into ordered collections and never into disordered collections. 
Nevertheless, context demands the narrow reading, because the passage follows an extended 
discussion of the relationship between a single substance and “the whole series of things of 
which it forms a part.” As in the letters to Arnauld from the same period, that relationship is 
hypothetical necessitation. The broad reading does not fit, because it implies that Adam may be 
conceived as Eve’s worldmate or as Evelyn’s, which is not compatible with Adam’s existence 
hypothetically necessitating Eve’s. The narrow reading, however, contributes to the discussion 
by broadening Leibniz’s claim: God would have created many substances expressed by a single 
idea even if God had created something other than this world. 
 The second passage is better known: 
[…] not only does nothing completely irregular occur in the world, but we would not even be able 
to imagine such a thing. Thus, let us assume, for example, that someone jots down a number of 
points at random on a piece of paper, as do those who practice the ridiculous art of geomancy. I 
maintain that it is possible to find a geometric line whose notion is constant and uniform, 
following a certain rule, such that this line passes through all the points in the same order in which 
the hand jotted them down. [Leibniz offers further examples.] Thus, one can say, in whatever 
manner God might have created the world, it would always have been regular and in accordance 
with a certain general order. […] I use these comparisons to sketch an imperfect likeness of divine 
wisdom and to point out something that can at least elevate our minds to conceive in some way 
what cannot be sufficiently expressed. But I do not claim to explain in this way the great mystery 
upon which the entire universe depends. [A.VI.iv.1537-1538/AG.39] 
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As with the previous passage, the troubling interpretation is broad and substantive, because it 
reads “whatever manner God might have created the world” to include every combination of 
essences or substances and concludes that any of these combinations would “have been regular.” 
Again, I argue that we should prefer a narrow and less substantive reading, on which “whatever 
manner” refers only to the uncreated worlds. 
 This passage provides further support for the narrow interpretation, by highlighting a way 
in which it is substantive after all, not metaphysically but epistemologically. At least for those 
who are struck by the descriptive power of mathematics, as Leibniz and his most likely readers 
were, the examples “sketch an imperfect likeness of divine wisdom.” The amazing but humanely 
intelligible way in which algebraic functions express geometrical figures prepares us to accept 
the amazing but mysterious way in which the entire universe depends on a single idea.29 
 
5 Conclusion 
Though composed of infinitely many substances, the created world expresses only an 
infinitesimal fraction of the essences in God’s mind. In one way or another, incompossibility 
relations explain this difference in scale between the created world and the divine ideas. 
 The standard approach has been to ground incompossibility relations in something other 
than harmony or metaphysical perfection, so that they might limit how much perfection God can 
pack into creation. This approach rests on the thought that God would have created more had it 
not been for incompossibility, because each additional substance created adds to the total 
perfection of the created world. That is, the standard approach rests on the ATV, on which the 
value of the world is the sum of the values of its parts. 
 The ATV finds its strongest support in the apparent mismatch between Leibniz’s 
ontology of aggregates and his theodicy. The ontology of aggregates assigns (almost) no value, 
reality, or metaphysical perfection to aggregates. Since the created world is an aggregate, Leibniz 
must be an acosmist, denying the reality and perfection of the world. On the other hand, the 
theodicy implies that creating a world is God’s best option and displays God’s own perfection in 
                                               
29 For an alternative interpretation of these passages, see Carlin 2000, 102-106. 
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an excellent way. A natural way to reconcile this tension is to assign value to the world only 
indirectly, by summing the values of what God does create, or substances. 
 This use of the ATV is at odds with Leibniz’s more holistic statements about the value of 
the world, and more importantly, it conflates intuitive cases of value summation, in which the 
whole shares the value making properties of its parts, with the special case at hand, in which 
value depends on unity and metaphysical independence, exactly what the created world lacks. 
 Fortunately, there is an alternative, supplied by the notion of an uncreated world, or in 
Leibniz’s terms, the series, system, or plan of the created world, the way it is, its law, or the one 
reason God creates all of it. An uncreated world, though constructed from essences, is intelligible 
on its own and in terms of itself. It is a unity, and thus suited to bear the high degree of value 
required by Leibniz’s theodicy. An essence contributes to the value of an uncreated world only 
indirectly, by way of its ideal relations to other essences, the very relations by which God grasps 
these essences in one thought. Variety within these unities may provide a basis for comparing 
uncreated worlds, but it does not follow that any particular uncreated world would be improved 
by the addition of another essence. 
 This unified theory of value is enough to replace the ATV and to open a new approach to 
incompossibility. The new approach defines compossibility as the relation between substances 
expressed by a single uncreated world. The uncreated worlds, in turn, are the ways that God can 
create if we take into account divine power and divine wisdom, but not (the full extent of) divine 
goodness. At one extreme, every substance is compossible with any substance, because 
substances are metaphysically independent, and so God has the power to create any combination. 
At the other extreme, only the substances in the actual world are compossible, because God’s 
goodness leads God to create the best. Between these extremes, we have the ways to create that 
are, in themselves, expressions of divine wisdom, the ways that have unity and hence perfection. 
Substances are compossible if and only if they are components of an aggregate, the idea of which 
is a unity that appeals to the divine will in virtue of its unity. 
 The middle way captures Leibniz’s use of the term “incompossible,” and the sense in 
which God cannot create incompossible substances. God cannot without being unwise. 
Moreover, the account iterates: the values of uncreated worlds fail to sum for the same reason 
that the values of substances do not sum. If several uncreated worlds had some combined value, 
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then there would be a unity comprising these uncreated worlds, in which case that unity would 
itself be an uncreated world with its own value. 
 This account of incompossibility exhibits a sort of unity that Leibniz perhaps found 
appealing. The account based on the ATV grounds the value of substances in their exemplary 
unity, independence, and intelligibility—but then adds a further principle, a function from the 
values of substances to the value of a world. This is a deus ex machina to make up for the created 
world’s lack of value grounding features. It would be simpler to explain the value of worlds and 
essences and substances all in the same way, in terms of unity. The critic from the opening quote 
mistook Leibniz for a Spinozist, who held “that there is a single substance for all things, and that 
this substance is mind.” The critic was wrong but almost right: there is a single idea for all things 
and this idea in God’s mind has value the way substances do. 
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